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COMMENTS 
CORPORATIONS-SHAREHOLDERS-MAJORITY LIABILITY FOR IM-
PROPER STOCK REDEMPTION BY CORPORATION AND FOR MISREPRE-
SENTATIONS IN PRIVATE STOCK PURCHASES FROM MINORITY HOLDERS 
- In 1942 a seemingly innocuous suit was brought against the 
Axton-Fisher Tobacco Corporation to determine the propriety of 
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the alteration of a stock redemption.1 In 1955 Judge Leahy of the 
Federal District Court for Delaware handed down an opinion on 
the damages and relief to be given in the case in what he hopefully 
termed was the final phase of this famous litigation.2 It is the pur-
pose of this comment to appraise the basis of the recovery allowed 
by Judge Leahy. Two readily distinguishable problems will be 
treated: (1) the nature of relief from a stock redemption called by 
fiduciaries in violation of their duties, and (2) the nature of relief 
(under both state common law and rule X-l0B-5 of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission3 ) for fraudulent purchase of stock by 
insiders. 
I. Summary of Events Leading Up to the Litigation 
The Axton-Fisher Tobacco Corporation of Kentucky was cap-
italized with three classes of stock - preferred, class A common, 
and class B common.4 In May of 1941 defendant Transamerica 
Corporation purchased 80,610 class B shares giving it 46.97 per-
cent control of the voting stock of Axton-Fisher. Transamerica 
arranged to have a new president and board chairman appointed 
who followed its bidding. The remaining board members (five of 
whom were replaced during the first year after the entry of Trans-
america into the picture) considered the president as representing 
the views and policy of Transamerica and endeavored to follow 
the president's suggestions. During the first year Transamerica 
considered a variety of plans to capitalize on the inventory gain 
resulting from wartime shortages of tobacco.5 Somewhere around. 
1 Taylor v. Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co., 295 Ky. 226, 173 S.W. (2d) 377 (1943). 
2 Speed v. Transamerica Corp., (D.C. Del. 1955) 135 F. Supp. 176. Other facets of this 
litigation are reported in: Geller v. Transamerica Corp., (D.C. Del. 1943) 53 F. Supp. 625, 
review den. (D.C. Del. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 248, affd. (3d Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 534; Zahn v. 
Transamerica Corp., (D.C. Del. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 243, revd. (3d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 36; 
Friedman v. Transamerica Corp., (D.C. Del. 1945), amendment den. (D.C. Del. 1945) 5 
F.R.D. 115, revd. sub nom. Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., (3d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 36; 
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., (D.C. Del. 1945) 5 F.R.D. 56, (D.C. Del. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 
457, (D.C. Del. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 808. An appeal on the merits is presently being made 
to the Second Circuit by Transamerica against the Zahn, Friedman, and Speed claimants. 
3 Promulgated under §10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. L. 891, 15 
u.s.c. (1952) §78j. 
4 The preferred stock (par value $100) bore interest of 6% and was to receive $105 
upon liquidation. Class A common (par value $10) was entitled to $3.20 cumulative annual 
dividends. Class B common (par value $10) could then receive up to $1.60 in annual 
dividends with any further dividends being shared equally by class A and class B stock. 
Class A stock was redeemable at $60 plus accrued dividends upon call by the corporation 
at any dividend date and was convertible into class B stock share for share at the holder's 
option. Upon liquidation, class A stock was entitled to twice as much per share as the 
class B stock. 
5 On July 31, 1942, tobacco inventories, carried on the company's books at $9,845,983.25 
(lower of cost or market value), had a replacement value of $19,307,557.00. 
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the middle of 1942 Transamerica developed a plan to capture the 
inventory profit by liquidation. On November 12, 1942, Trans-
america made a written offer to all minority stockholders to buy 
class A common at $40 per share and class B common at $12 per 
share, both prices being substantially above the market price. 
Neither Axton-Fisher nor Transamerica disclosed the rise in in-
ventory, the increased earnings of Axton-Fisher, or the intent to 
liquidate prior to or during the time the offer was open. As a 
result of this offer, Transamerica got 69.43 percent of Axton-Fisher 
voting stock and continued to make further purchases from time 
to time. Early in 1943, Transamerica converted its class A shares 
to class B shares. At Transamerica's "suggestion," Axton-Fisher's 
board called the outstanding A shares for redemption, the directors 
believing that Transamerica's purpose was to recapitalize the com-
pany. No disclosure was made as to company plans or operations 
at the time of the call. Later the board sought to make the call 
optional, but in a suit for a declaratory judgment the Kentucky 
Court of Appeals held that the B holders had acquired vested rights 
under the call and that it could not be altered. 6 In the spring of 
1944 Axton-Fisher was dissolved and the assets were sold or dis-
tributed as a liquidating dividend. Transamerica's profit on the 
investment amounted to more than $9,000,000.7 
II. History of the Litigation 
The rights of minority holders who had sold stock to Trans-
america under the offer of November 12, 1942, were first asserted 
in a common law action alleging misrepresentation and non-dis-
closure and praying for tort damages or rescission. Judge Leahy 
found there had been no actionable misrepresentation alleged in 
the pleadings and allowed defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment on the ground that, und,er Kentucky law, a majority stock-
holder has no duty, fiduciary or otherwise, to disclose material facts 
known prior to a purchase from minority holders.8 In 1945, Zahn 
and other stockholders who had been subject to the redemption 
call filed suit against·Transamerica on the theory that the redemp-
tion was a violation of the defendant's fiduciary duty as controlling 
shareholder. Judge Leahy allowed defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the ground that redemption was a matter of 
6 Taylor v. Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co., 295 Ky. 226, 113 S.W. (2d) 377 (1943). 
7 The statement of facts above was taken from Judge Leahy's finding of facts on the 
merits in Speed v. Transamerica Corp., (D.C. Del. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 808 at 833-843, 848. 
8 Geller v. Transamerica Corp., (D.C. Del. 1943) 53 F. Supp. 625, review den. (D.C. 
Del. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 248, affd. (3d Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 534. 
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contract and that the defendant had no fiduciary duty to minority 
shareholders under Kentucky law.0 On appeal, the Third Circuit 
reversed, holding that while an impartial board could exercise a 
redemption call, the call was actually exercised, under the allega-
tions of the complaint, by the defendant. The court said that 
those in control of a corporation had a fiduciary relationship to the 
stockholders and that a redemption call designed to benefit major-
ity holders at the expense of the minority was a violation of this 
fiduciary duty and, therefore, voidable in equity. The suit was 
remanded for trial on the merits with instructions that the Zahn 
group should receive "their aliquot share at the time of dissolu-
tion" in accordance with remedies prescribed by the law of the 
forum, Delaware.10 In the trial on the merits, plaintiff proved its 
allegations and the problems of remedy and the measure of relief 
were referred to a special master.11 · 
In the interim, Speed and another group of sellers to Trans-
america under the purchase offer of November 12, 1942, brought 
suit for damages. The first count was based on common law deceit, 
and the other three counts alleged a violation of rule X-IOB-5 of 
the SEC. The common law count was dismissed,12 but was subse-
quently reinstated on the basis that public statements by Trans-
america and its letter of offer were misleading in the light of its 
intent to liquidate. The defendant was held liable on this count 
apparently on the ground that it had impliedly represented that 
Axton-Fisher would continue as a going concern. Liability under 
the federal counts was predicated on defendant's duty under the 
rule to disclose material facts affecting the value of the stock known 
to the majority holder by virtue of its inside position. The specific 
form of the relief was left to a special master.13 
III. Nature of Relief 
When the special master died without signing the final report 
on the measure of recovery, Judge Leahy made an independent 
determination. In a manner reminiscent of the many holding com-
pany reorganizations he has handled, he determined that the only 
"fair and equitable" solution would be to allow all the plaintiffs 
and the defendant to participate in a "reconstructed liquidation" 
9 Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., (D.C. Del. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 243. 
10 Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., (3d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 36. 
11 Speed v. Transamerica Corp., (D.C. Del. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 808 at 843. 
12Speed v. Transamerica Corp., (D.C. Del. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 457. 
13 Speed v. Transameri~ Corp., (D.C. Del. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 808. 
1956] COMMENTS 975 
as class B holders, the situation which he believed would have 
existed had no fraud or unfairness been involved. 
A. Zahn Holders- Relief for Redemption in Violation of 
Fiduciary Duty. In deciding that the Zahn plaintiffs would not 
participate as class A common holders in the liquidation, Judge 
Leahy may well be controverting the mandate of his appellate 
court.14 From the language of the court of appeals opinion, it 
would appear that Judge Biggs intended the reference to Zahn's 
"aliquot share" to refer to his position as a class A holder. Indeed, 
it would seem that the controlling theory of the decision was that 
the board of directors, as fiduciaries, were not entitled to favor 
Transamerica, the class B stockholder, by employing the redemp-
tion provisions of the charter for its benefit.15 In this light, Judge 
Leahy's "reconstructed liquidation" appears to be no more than a 
bit of artful maneuvering around the mandate of the court of 
appeals. Perhaps Judge Leahy found latitude in the ambiguities 
obviously existing in the appellate court's opinion. It would seem 
more likely, however, that he decided as he did in the belief that 
the upper court had overreached itself in its first opinion and might 
be quite willing to accept an opportunity for retrenchment. 
The opinion of Judge Biggs in the court of appeals is still 
somewhat unique in American decisions. While this is not the 
only case where fiduciary concepts have been raised by claimants 
to restrain redemption,1 6 it seems to be the only one where these 
concepts have controlled the decision. Most of the opinion was 
devoted to an attempt to establish a general fiduciary duty attach-
ing to those in control of the corporation, with no real effort made 
to elucidate the nature of the duty or the act constituting the 
breach. That mere control by the majority is not a breach in itself 
would seem uncontested.17 Apparently, authority for finding a 
breach lay, by analogy, in the dissolution cases cited by the court.18 
14 See Briggs v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 68 S.Ct. 1039 (1948). 
15 See Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., (3d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 36 at 45. 
16 See Stieglitz v. Electrol, Inc., (N.Y. 1945) 60 N.Y.S. (2d) 490, in which the court 
denied a suit to enjoin redemption of preferred stock. Plaintiffs had alleged fiduciary 
double dealing in that two of the three directors voting affirmatively were shareowners 
standing to benefit by the redemption. The court noted that while directors may not act 
against the corporation's interest for their private and personal gain, they are free to pass 
on any matter in which they are involved as shareholders. Here the directors were said 
to have acted within the scope of their authority and in a manner consistent with the 
provisions of the certificate of incorporation. 
17 Landstreet v. Meyer, 201 Miss. 826, 29 S. (2d) 653 (1947). See 13 A11r. JUR., Cor-
porations §422 (1938). 
18 See Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., (3d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 36 at 46-47. This 
approach was suggested in 41 ILL. L. REv. 122 (1946). 
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The difficulty in accepting this analogy lies in the fact that in the 
dissolution cases the majority holders took property for themselves 
to which they had no right by statute, charter, or otherwise.19 The 
question of whether the class B holders of Axton-Fisher did have 
such a right was almost entirely ignored. 
This case, if nothing else, illustrates the danger of the whole-
sale importation of the fiduciary duty commonly attached to direc-
tors into the arena of majority and minority shareholder contests. 
Directors. are in a proper sense custodians. Shareholders, on the 
other hand, are beneficially interested in the operations of the 
corporation. The interests of various classes of shareholders are 
often legitimately opposed, and one class must necessarily profit 
at the expense of the others. To say that a director should not 
profit at the expense of his cestui is one thing, but to apply the 
same logic and hold that the majority shareholders, in a case of 
conflicting interest, should gratuitously benefit minority share-
holders is a non sequitur. In the principal case, the choice was 
between redemption or no redemption. It would seem obvious 
that the rights to that redemption should not be determined in a 
vacuum. There must be a starting point. 
Taylor v. Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co.20 would seem sufficient 
to point out that the rights of stockholders inter se are regulated 
and determined by the corporate charter. If there were any re-
maining doubts as to the methods employed under Kentucky law 
in analyzing stockholder rights in redemption cases, they must 
surely have been settled by Thompson v. Fairleigh.21 This case 
asserted that the corporate charter is a contract both between the 
corporation and the stockholders and also between the stockholders 
inter se, and is the source of and limitation on all stockholder rights. 
Approached in this manner, the question becomes: if the ma-
jority has the right to control, under what circumstances does the 
10 See, generally, Lattin, "Limitations on Statutory or Charter Powers Given to Majority 
Stockholders," 30 MrCH. L. REv. 645 (1932). In discussing the leading cases on the dissolution 
theory, Lattin notes th:\t the dissolution sale of assets to the majority involved in these 
cases would have been sufficient to find liability without the introduction of fiduciary 
principles in regard to the dissolution itself. In dismissing the adaptation of fiduciary 
principles to these cases as unnecessary but convenient and harmless, the author appar-
ently did not foresee some of the broader implications which other courts might attach 
to that concept. 
20 295 Ky. 226, 1!73 S.W. (2d) 377 (1943). 
21 300 Ky. 144, 187 S.W. (2d) 812 (1945). Textwriters and annotators have consistently 
recognized this as a .uniform approach by common law courts. See 13 AM. JuR., Corpora-
tions §318 (1938); 88 A.L.R. 1131 (1934); 12 FLETCHER, CYc. CORP., perm. ed., §5443 (1932); 
BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, rev. ed., §§212, 218 (1946). 
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charter give them the right to call the class A common?22 The re-
demption provision itself contained no limitations whatsoever.23 It 
is difficult to imagine how any contractual agreement could more 
clearly express the fact that the A stock was subject to being wiped 
out at any time by certain action. Nothing in the dissolution pro-
visions24 suggests any limitation on the power to redeem. Nor 
would there seem to be any reasonable grounds for finding such 
a limitation by construing the two provisions together. If any A 
holders exist at the moment of dissolution, it is clear that they are 
entitled to participate in the liquidation. It would seem equally 
clear that where a call was made in accordance with the redemp-
tion provisions, the class A holders would have no further rights 
in the corporation either at liquidation or at any other time.25 
Viewed in this light, the redemption would seem entirely proper. 
Does the addition of fiduciary concepts require a different con-
struction of the rights of the parties? In light of the general rule 
regarding determination of the rights of shareholders,26 the answer 
would seem to be no. Such concepts are not grounds for rewriting 
the charter. They do, however, have an important bearing upon 
the conduct of the controlling stockholders during the operation 
of the corporation. Since fiduciaries have a duty to act fairly and 
22 Judge Leahy understandably did not attempt this approach in his final opinion 
since it would have patently contradicted the court of appeals opinion of Judge Biggs. 
23 The charter provided as follows: 
"The whole or any part of the Class A common stock of the corporation, at the option 
of the Board of Directors, may be redeemed on any quarterly dividend payment date by 
paying therefor in cash Sixty dollars ($60.00) per share and all unpaid and accrued divi• 
<lends thereon at the date fixed for such redemption, upon sending by mail to the regis• 
tered holders of the Class A common stock at least sixty (60) days' notice of the exercise 
of such option. If at any time the Board of Directors shall determine to redeem less than 
the whole amount of Class A common stock then outstanding, the particular stock to be 
so redeemed shall be determined in such manner as the Board of Directors shall prescribe; 
provided, however, that no holder of Class A common stock shall be preferred over any 
other holder of such stock." Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., (3d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 36 
at 39, n. 3. 
24 The charter provided as follows: 
"In the event of the dissolution, liquidation, merger, or consolidation of the corpora• 
tion, or sale of substantially all its assets, whether voluntary or involuntary, there shall be 
paid to the holders of the preferred stock then outstanding $105 per share, together with 
all unpaid accrued dividends thereon, before any sum shall be paid to or any assets dis• 
tributed among the holders of the Class A common stock and/or the holders of the Class 
B common stock. After such payment to the holders of the preferred stock, and all unpaid 
accrued dividends on the Class A common stock shall have been paid, then all remaining 
assets and funds of the corporation shall be divided among and paid to the holders of 
the Class A common stock and to the holders of the Class B common stock in the ratio of 
2 to 1, that is to say, there shall be paid upon each share of Class A common stock twice 
the amount paid upon each share of Class B common stock, in any such event." Zahn v. 
Transamerica Corp., (3d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 36 at 38, n. 2 • 
.25 See Hackett v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 36 Misc. 583, 73 N.Y.S. 1087 (1901). 
26 See note 21 supra. 
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in good faith toward their beneficiaries,27 it would not be surpris-
ing if the courts found a duty to disclose on the part of responsible 
members of the corporation under the circumstances of this case. 
The minority would seem to be entitled to some information from 
its corporation relevant to a decision on the election to convert.28 
But to extend the fairness concept to the. extent of nullifying the 
charter provisions and prohibiting the call overlooks the basic 
business facts involved. Judge Leahy's argument and citations29 
are representative of the unanimity of authority in the business and 
legal fields which recognizes (1) that a call option in senior s~curi-
ties is reserved for the benefit of junior securities as well as the 
corporation, and (2) that the price paid for a callable security is 
based upon the realization that its market price cannot be expected 
to rise much above the call price for any substantial period of time. 
The investor buys. at a price reflecting this limitation, and the ex-
pectation of anything more suggests naivete. 
One limitation in the application of Judge Leahy's business 
and legal authority on this poi~t is that the situations envisioned 
in the authorities are almost always going concerns not in liquida-
tion.30 This has been used as an argument that call provisions 
were not intended to be used in contemplation of liquidation.31 
The obvious answer to this is that the authorities refer to call pro-
visions in terms of their most common use. Dissolution is a matter 
for which there is always provision but little expectation. But this 
does not change the basic relationships of the parties involved. 
Whether the corporation is a going concern or one approaching 
dissolution, the holders of the common stock are still the backbone 
of the corporation and the ultimate claimants to the corporation's 
financial resources should the business prove successful. The call-
able preferred securities are always temporary financing shares sub-
ject at any time to removal from the scene should company fortunes 
27 See 13 AM. JUR., Corporations §§422, 423 (1937). 
28 Judge Leahy presumed this to be the real basis of liability. The writer knows of 
no cases where the courts have imposed a duty of disclosure upon the corporation in 
making a stock call. But compare Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., (D.C. 
Ill. 1952) ·103 F. Supp. 954, where the court said that whatever the position of a director 
when he acts for himself, he occupies the position· of a trustee to each individual share-
holder when he acts on behalf of the company in buying stock. Contra, Gladstone v. The 
Murray Co., 314 Mass. 584, 50 N.E. (2d) 958 (1943). 
29 Sec Speed v. Transamerica Corp., (D.C. Del. 1955) 135 F. Supp. 176 at 182, 183. 
30 While the SEC reorganization and dissolution cases would seem to be closest in 
point, the investment value theory employed in these cases considers various stockholder 
interests from the standpoint of a going concern. See Dodd, "Preferred Shareholders' 
Rights-The Engineers Public Service Company Case,'' 63 HAR.v. L. REV. 298 (1949). 
31 See 33 CoRN. L.Q. 414 at 420-421 (1948). 
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indicate the advantage of such a move. Their prospects of par-
ticipating in the fortunes of the corporation are transitory in na-
ture. That the profits reaped by the common stock occurred in 
dissolution rather than in large "going-concern dividends" subse-
quent to call is of no concern to them.32 To say that the holders 
of such callable securities are entitled to more than they bargained 
for is pure hindsight. 
B. Speed Claimants-Relief under Rule X-J0B-5 and for 
Common Law Deceit. The basis for affording relief to the Speed 
claimants is somewhat unclear in the opinion. The Speed plain-
tiffs originally pleaded four counts - one count based on common 
law deceit and three counts based on rule X-IOB-5 of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. 33 The opinion on the merits suggested 
that the requested relief was for compensatory damages based upon 
the difference between the purchase price and the value at the 
time of sale -apparentiy a loss theory of recovery.34 Judge Leahy's 
decree made no attempt to differentiate between common law relief 
on the deceit count and relief based upon the violations of the rule. 
It is clear, however, that the basis of relief given was .restitutionary 
rather than compensatory. 
32 Even the more extreme of the dissolution cases cited by Judge Biggs admit the 
right of the majority to dissolve a profitable going concern when a true dissolution was 
contemplated, as here. See Sprecher, "Right of Minority Stockholders to Prevent the 
Dissolution of a Profitable Enterprise," 33 KY. L.J. 150 (1945). Implicit in Judge Biggs' 
reasoning would seem to be an adaptation of the view prevalent in the dissolution cases 
that a motive to make use of dissolution machinery for something other than real 
dissolution is an actionable wrong. It is difficult to see how this theory carries over to a 
case where redemption, not dissolution, is used to cut off the interests of stockholders. 
Granting that the motive here was to cut off the interests of the A holders in order to 
benefit the B holders, this, as noted before, is one of the basic purposes of such a provi-
sion. In the only redemption case found in which motive was discussed, the court did not 
decide whether the motive was relevant; it merely noted that in any event the motive 
present in the case was a justifiable one-to benefit the common holders by increased 
earnings. The court attached no legal significance to the plaintiff's allegations that the 
preferred redemption had been forced by the majority common holders. Weidenfeld v. 
Northern Pacific R. Co., (8th Cir. 1904) 129 F. 305. 
33 Pursuant to authority conferred by §10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
48 Stat. L. 891, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §78j, the commission promulgated the following rule in 
1942: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange, 
(I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." S.E.C. Rel. No. 3230, May 21, 
1942, 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Serv, ,r25,375. 
34 See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., (D.C. Del. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 808 at 812. 
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I. Restitution and misrepresentation. At common law, relief 
in a deceit action is based upon a theory of affirmance of the trans-
action and is compensatory in nature - the measure of recovery 
commonly being the difference between the sale price and the 
'·'true" value at the time of the sale.35 Professor Loss, whom Judge 
Leahy cites as an authority on rule X-IOB-5, suggests that the same 
measure of relief would be available in an action based on that 
rule, with the alternative being an election to rescind, with resti-
tutionary relief then being available.36 The latter form of relief 
is now generally available either at law or in equity where the 
vendor has sold property on the basis of the buyer's misrepresenta-
tions.37 In the case cited by Judge Leahy as indicative of the exist-
ence of the special facts doctrine in Kentucky, similar relief was 
given in a suit in equity.38 Assuming that the facts here constitute 
special facts justifying intervention by a court applying Kentucky 
law, there would seem to be no reason why a defrauded vendor 
could not rescind or seek rescission and compel restitution of profits 
by the vendee under the common law count. If statutory liability 
is to be imposed, the general availability of restitutionary relief in 
deceit situations39 provides an argument for its use under rule 
X-IOB-5. 
Whether liability is enforced under the state or federal counts, 
however, it is not clear how the court awarded restitution when the 
plaintiff prayed for damages amounting to the difference between 
the sale price and the value at the time of the transaction in an 
action apparently based on affirmance of the contract. Aparf from 
the problem of election of remedies,40 it is unclear how the court 
35 See 3 TOR.TS REsTATEMENT §549 (1934). Occasionally, a deceit case suggests relief 
that appears restitutionary in nature. Thus, in Staker v. Reese, 82 W.Va. 764, 97 S.E. 641 
(1918), the court affirmed a measure of relief amounting to the difference between the 
price paid by the fraudulent vendee of stock and the price received on resale. The resale 
contract was made before the fraudulent purchase, however, and it appears that the court 
accepted this as conclusive evidence of the stock value. The basic principle of recovery 
was said to be compensatory-the difference between the amount received and the actual 
value at the time of the sale. 
36 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1065 (1951). 
37 See REsTmmoN REsTATEMENT §39 (1937); Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 29 S.Ct. 
521 (1909); United States Trust Co. v. Chicago Terminal Transfer R. Co., (7th Cir. 1911) 
188 F. 292. . 
38 Hays v. Meyers, 139 Ky. 440, 107 S.W. 287 (1908). Under the special facts doctrine, 
the existence of unusual circumstances in a sale may impart a duty of disclosure in the 
absence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship. See 3 FLETCHER, CYc. CORP., perm. ed., 
§ 1171 (1947). 
39 See note 37 supra. 
40 According to the Restatement, institution of an action for deceit is a conclusive 
election to affirm the sale contract and proceed on a damage-loss theory of liability, subject 
to limitations which are not material here. REsTrrtm:oN REsTATEMENT §68 (1937). This 
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reaches a decision that restitutionary principles will govern the 
measure of relief. While it is believed that restitution should be 
available on the facts of this case, Judge Leahy's decision breaks 
new ground in determining the basis and nature of relief avail-
able under rule X-l0B-541 and will have an important bearing on 
liability under this rule in future litigation. Relief should not be 
limited to recovery on restitution principles. It 1vould seem desir-
able that defrauded investors should be able to retain their bar-
gain and sue for damages should they seek to do so. On the other 
hand, courts may find that the defrauded party has, by his own 
conduct, created a situation in which injustice would occur were 
the party committing the fraud compelled to disgorge benefits 
flowing from the transaction. Promptness of action and facts indi-
cating affirmance of the contract or ability to restore the status quo 
by the defrauded party, among other factors, should be considered 
before restitution can be fairly granted. 
2. Theories of liability under rule X-l0B-5. Part of the prob-
lem created by civil liability under rule X-lOB-5 lies in the un-
settled nature of the underlying basis of such liability. Possible 
alternatives are (1) implied liability based upon the statute and the 
rule with the selection of remedies derived from an interpretation 
of the statute and congressional policy, or (2) general tort liability 
based on violation of the federal statute and regulation. This gen-
eral tort liability may conceivably be governed by federal common 
law principles or the law of the forum. 
Both implied liability and general tort theory are suggested 
by Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,42 which Judge Leahy cites 
with approval. As to the former, Judge Kirkpatrick in the Kardon 
case stated that section 29 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 voids all contracts which violate the statute, necessarily im-
plying the existence of a remedy. Judge Leahy's analogy to cases 
doctrine has received apparent support in the federal courts. United States v. Oregon 
Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 43 S.Ct. 100 (1922): Harris v. Egger, (6th Cir. 1915) 226 F. 389. 
But see National Lock Co. v. Hogland, (7th Cir. 1938) 101 F. (2d) 576. 
41Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, (D.C. Ark. 1949) 85 F. Supp. 
104, is apparently the first case in which a specific judgment for private damages was 
rendered under rule X-IOB-5. The action was for losses occasioned by the purchase of 
stock which was never received. The court included in its damage estimate the purchase 
price, shipping expense, postage, and defendant's commissions, while excluding the com-
missions of defendant's correspondent. Two of the stock orders had been tendered into 
court by the defendant, and the court gave the plaintiffs the option of damage or the 
stock, citing a federal case holding that there is no bar by an election of remedies where 
the pleadings are ambiguous. 
¼2 (D.C. Pa. 1946) 69 F. Supp. 512, (D.C. Pa. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 798. 
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of short swing transactions under the same act43 would suggest ad-
herence to a view of wringing the form of relief out of an interpre-
tation of the statute without regard for previous federal or state 
common law rules of deceit. This would suggest that restitutionary 
principles, alone, would govern relief under rule X-IOB-5.44 
Much of the remainder of Judge Leahy's opinion, however, 
suggests reliance more on general tort law, in keeping with the 
main theme developed by the Kardon case. This approach runs 
right into the problem of whether federal or state law will be con-
trolling. Judge Kirkpatrick in the Kardon case45 appeared to 
place reliance upon the use of state common law. A later case by 
the same judge suggests more clearly that the action is to be con-
ceived, at least from the standpoint of remedy and measure of 
relief, in terms of the analogous state common law tort of deceit.46 
Other cases have expressly repudiated the use of state law, holding 
that the existence of the federally created right under rule X-IOB-5 
requires application of exclusively federal law to the problem of 
the remedy.47 
Fundamental to the question here, of course, is the application 
of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins48 to cases of this nature.49 While it 
is clear that federal judges must interpret federal statutes on the 
basis of the language of the act and the congressional policy ex-
pressed therein, it is impossible to lay down a general rule when 
they are forced to go beyond the act in question for a rule of law. 
The Sixth. Circuit seems committed to the proposition that 
while the right created by a federal statute is subject to federal 
interpretation completely .apart from state law, the remedy and 
form of relief must follow the law of the forum.50 Other federal 
43 On this point Judge Leahy cites: Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., (2d Cir. 1943) 136 F. 
(2d) 231; Gratz v. Claughton, (2d Cir. 1951) 187 F. (2d) 46. That the Second Circuit did 
not consider its reasoning as to specific liability imposed by the 1934 act to extend to 
liabilities implied from other parts of the act, see Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., (2d 
Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 461. 
44 See 41 VA. L. R.Ev. 1114 (1955). 
45 See (D.C. Pa. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 798. 
46 Gorsuch v. Bangert, (D.C. Pa. 1952) 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Serv., V,90,537. 
47 Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1949) 81 F. Supp. 1014. The court 
cited United States v. Silliman, (3d Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 607 at 611, n. 11, as indicating 
that the Third Circuit supports a remedy based on state common law. In Slavin v. Ger-
mantown Fire Ins. Co., (3d Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 799, the majority relied heavily on 
Pennsylvania law, although no express stand was taken. 
48304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938). 
49 See 48 CoL. L. R.Ev. 1090 (1948). 
50 See Hamilton Foundry & Machine Co. v. International Molders & Foundry Workers 
Union of North America, (6th Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 209. 
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decisions, however, have suggested that a federal common law is 
still very much alive in some areas dominated by federal statutes.51 
It is beyond the scope of this comment to attempt to reconcile 
the conflicting policy and constitutional power questions in-
volved.52 While there would seem to be strong indications of an 
emerging federal common law which would pre-empt the field 
where federal rights have been created by federal criminal stat-
utes,53 the pattern is far from set. Since the outcome of this ques-
tion is determinative of many problems affecting the scope and 
availability of relief under statutes and regulations such as that in 
question in the principal case, it is unfortunate that Judge Leahy 
did not present his thoughts more clearly. 
3. Introduction of fiduciary concepts. In circumventing some 
of the problems discussed above, Judge Leahy employed a wide 
variety of authority to justify restitutionary relief. It is perhaps 
unfortunate that in order to justify relief of an equitable nature, 
much of the argument suggested that such relief was warranted 
because the defendants were subject to a fiduciary duty. It is sub-
mitted that neither the problems of the case nor the authority relied 
upon require introduction of fiduciary principles. As Judge Leahy 
observed,54 misrepresentation has traditionally been accepted as 
a basis for equity jurisdiction. While restitution is of an equitable 
nature, it is, as noted before, available in either legal or equitable 
forms in misrepresentation cases.55 Part of the special master's opin-
ion incorporated in Judge Leahy's decision indicates that fiduciary 
51 See O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1st Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 539. Cf. Sola 
Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 63 S.Ct. 172 (1942). The Second Circuit 
recently placed itself on record as considering the 1934 act within this category. Stella 
v. Kaiser, (2d Cir. 1955) 221 F. (2d) 115. Under this view the form of relief would be 
strongly ip.fluenced by previous federal concepts of deceit actions. Cf. Ricketts v. Penn• 
sylvania R. Co., (2d Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 757. 
52 Even if the federal courts have the power to apply federal common law under the 
constitutional power to settle cases and controversies, there remains the policy question of 
whether the right should be exercised. Cf. National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright 
Co., (D.C. Mass. 1942) 47 F. Supp. 499, affd. (1st Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 618. 
53 See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773 (1946); Dice v. Akron, Canton & 
Youngstown R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 72 S.Ct. 312 (1952); O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 
(1st Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 539. 
54 (D.C. Del. 1955) 135 F. Supp. 176 at 188. 
55 Recovery on quasi contract at law is frequently limited to value at the time of 
the transaction. Felder v. Reeth, (9th Cir. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 744. This apparently was one 
of the main reasons for Judge Leahy's elaborate argument to introduce equitable princi-
ples. As noted supra the Restatement of Restitution makes no distinctions between legal 
and equitable actions in this regard and sanctions recovery of the wrongdoer's profits. In 
any event, defendant's evidence of market value of the stock, which would have allowed 
a recovery considerably less than a share of the sale proceeds of the liquidation, was re-
jected by the court. 
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concepts ·are unnecessary to acquire jurisdiction for restitutionary 
relief.56 Judge Bigg's opinion from the Zahn case is quoted as 
authority for the introduction of fiduciary concepts but the case 
there concerned acts relating to corporate powers, not purchases 
of stock by individuals.57 Nor is it clear why the Kardon case should 
be employed as authority that a fiduciary relationship exists by 
virtue of rule X-l0B-5. In that case fiduciary concepts were adopted 
because they were believed to be appropriate, under the rules of 
all jurisdictions, to the particular facts of the case.58 
The principal case goes farther than any other case in imposing, 
by virtue of rule X-IOB-5, a blanket fiduciary duty, on stockholders 
with all the attendant problems and tendency toward oversimplifi-
cation inherent in such a concept.59 Absent fiduciary principles, 
one can agree with Professor Loss that, in appropriate circum-
stances, traditional forms of equity relief should be available.60 
When value restitution is sought, as in the principal case, there 
is even less justification for hanging the decision on forced con-
cepts of fiduciary relationships. 
James M. Tobin 
56 Id. at 190. 
57 At least one Kentucky case suggests that the majority has a fiduciary duty toward 
the minority when disposing of corporate assets during dissolution. See Kaye v. Kentucky 
Public Elevator Co., 295 Ky. 661, 175 S.W. (2d) 142 (1943). But to extend this duty to a 
stockholder when making a private purchase of stock would appear to be completely in-
consistent with Kentucky corporation law. See Geller v. Transamerica Corp., (D.C. Del. 
1943) 53 F. Supp. 625, review den. (D.C. Del. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 248, affd. (3d Cir. 1945) 
151 F. (2d) 534. 
58 (D.C. Pa. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 798. The court stated that the transaction involved 
was essentially a sale by directors, in their own interests, of corporate assets otherwise than 
in the course of business and without disclosure to shareholders. This was stated to 
complete the cause of action without regard for the purchase of shares contrary to rule 
X-IOB-5 with the natural remedy being an accounting for the profits from the transaction. 
Judge Kirkpatrick observed that such relief was consistent. with general rules governing 
fiduciary relationships and said (at 803): "These principles are fundamental in all juris-
dictions and the decisions of both Pennsylvania and Michigan fully support the conclu-
sions reached above." 
59 Cases involving rule X-IOB-5 are collected in Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 827 
(1951), and Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION (1955 Supp.) 328. Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. 
Co., (3d Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 799, would appear to suggest that the Third Circuit does 
not favor finding a general fiduciary relationship imposed by the rule. For an example of 
the ramifications of attaching general fiduciary responsibilities to buyers and sellers under 
the act, the reader should examine the complainant's theory of recovery in Birnbaum v. 
Newport Steel Corp., (2d Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 461. 
60 See Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1065 (1951), quoted in Speed v. Transamerica, 
(D.C. Del. 1955) 135 F. Supp. 176 at 187. 
